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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
To say that the Louisiana law on prescription is complicated,
puts it mildly. In addition to the basic provisions in the Civil Code,
there are time limitations in any number of statutes throughout the
spectrum of subject matters. When there is inadequate care in the
legislative drafting, the result is a confusion which creates uncer-
tainty in the law and more work for the courts. The judicial determi-
nation may clarify the legislative intent, or it may in fact create one
where none really existed. The latter seems to have been the case with
Act 584 of 1960 which appears in R.S. 9:5682 in the following terms:
An action by one heir or legatee . . . is prescribed in ten years if
the third person or his ancestors in title, singly or collectively,
have been in continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and
unequivocal possession of the property ...
The first phrase is written in language of liberative prescription, the
second part is a verbatim reproduction of the language of the ten-year
acquisitive prescription in article 3487. This is distinguished from the
thirty-year acquisitive prescription language in article 3500 where the
word "peaceable" does not appear.
The statute poses a number of questions: (1) is the prescription
liberative or acquisitive? (2) if acquisitive, are the requirements of
"good faith" and "just title" necessary? (3) what rules govern "tack-
ing" of possessions?
When a statutory provision is as ambivalent as this one, the
questions could possibly be answered in one way or another. In such
circumstances, the judicial determinations are policy decisions. This
may explain the variety of opinions that have been expressed. In
Trahan v. Broussard,' the supreme court held that the prescription
was acquisitive but that good faith was not required. On the latter
point, there was a well-reasoned dissent which was supported by a
majority of the court on rehearing in All-State Credit Plan Natchi-
toches, Inc. v. Ratliff,' thereby overruling Trahan to that extent.
Furthermore, with the application of the Civil Code general princi-
ples of ten-year acquisitive prescription, it is not permissible to tack
a good faith possession to a bad faith possession in order to satisfy
the time requirement. The latest decision was not without dissent but
* Emeritus Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 251 La. 714, 206 So. 2d 82 (1968).
2. 279 So. 2d 660 (La. 1973).
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the conclusions are sound and well-reasoned, and should remain that
way.3:
ACQUISrIVE PRESCRIPTION
Precarious Possession
A precarious possessor is one who occupies a property while the
legal possession is vested in another. He lacks the requirement of
possessing "as owner" because the nature of his holding acknowl-
edges another person as the owner, such as the tenant who holds
under a lease from a different person. To change a precarious posses-
sion into the kind of legal possession that is necessary for acquisitive
prescription is obviously not a simple matter nor is it often estab-
lished. However, it can be done where the precarious possessor ac-
companies his occupation with acts which are hostile and adverse and
give notice to the legal possessor that he (the precarious possessor)
means to possess henceforth as exclusive owner.
A co-heir who takes over the whole property is a precarious pos-
sessor of the shares of his co-heirs, and an owner in indivision cannot
acquire by prescription the rights of his co-owners in the property
owned in common. However, in Givens v. Givens4 the person occu-
pied the whole property in accordance with a recorded instrument of
donation (omnium bonorum), and although this transaction was an
absolute nullity the court held that the recordation constituted suffi-
cient notice to transform the precarious possession into a legal posses-
sion for thirty-year acquisitive prescription. This amounts to saying
that the constructive (and improbable) knowledge of what is on the
public records, even an absolute nullity, may be considered as meet-
ing the test of an "overt manifestation" although the open physical
occupation of the property does not serve this purpose. Analytically,
the conclusion does not sit well; however, as a policy matter, the
decision may serve the interests of society in the stabilization of land
titles. In refusing a writ, the supreme court said "on the facts found
. . .the result is correct." 5
3. See also Kasell, Suits against the United States Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 14 LoYOLA L. REV. 64 (1967-68); Pascal, Civil Code and Related
Subject Matter, 21 LA. L. REV. 64 (1960); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1966-1967 Term-Prescription, 28 LA. L. REV. 346, 352 (1968); Note, 42 TuL.
L. REv. 219 (1967).
4. 273 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
5. Givens v. Givens, 275 So. 2d 868 (La. 1973).
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Good Faith
Board of Commissioners v. Elmer' contains a very good discus-
sion of the elements necessary for the ten-year acquisitive prescrip-
tion, but these comments are directed only to the matter of "good
faith." This requires not only a subjective positive belief but also an
objective reasonable basis of facts for this belief that the acquired
title is valid. Although there is no duty to make a formal title exami-
nation, the courts have held that circumstances which should excite
inquiry create a duty to examine title; thus, failure to do so is the
same as having checked the records without finding the flaw, thereby
precluding good faith.' A non-warranty deed, by its very nature, as-
serts the refusal of the transferor to stand behind the conveyance so
that, analytically, the transferee is given an uncertainty and a doubt.
However, from a practical viewpoint, the quit-claim deed has been
so extensively used in Louisiana that the courts have accepted it as
a basis for the good faith prescription of ten years.'
In the cited case, there was not only a non-warranty deed but
also a suspiciously low price, and the court held that "the reasonable-
ness of the purchase price is one of the critical factors bearing upon
the issue of good faith."9 On rehearing, the case was remanded to
establish the property value, but in the footnote to the above quota-
tion, the author of the opinion makes the following statement:
I do not believe the purpose of these codal articles was to permit
the passage of ten years to cure the defects in the title of a person
who speculated by purchasing property at an insignificant price
under a quit-claim deed (especially from a vendor who acquired
by tax sales) or other deed of doubtful validity. There is no legal
good faith in this type of purchaser, and only the prescription of
30 years is applicable.
If, after trial on remand, it is found that the purchase price
paid by Dr. Elmer in 1949 was so insignificant in comparison to
the actual value of the property that when considered with the
other facts and circumstances of this case, he could not have
reasonably believed his vendor's title was valid, his claim of own-
ership based on possession for ten years in good faith should be
denied. '0
6. 268 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 263 La. 613, 268 So. 2d 675
(1972).
7. Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La. 921, 54 So. 2d 325 (1951).
8. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So. 2d 335 (1943), noted in 5
LA. L. REv. 484 (1943).
9. 268 So. 2d at 284.
10. Id. n.4.
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LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Classification of the Cause of Action
As long as there are so many different periods for the prescription
of various kinds of causes of action, there will be disputes concerning
their classification. Until such time as the categories can be reduced
or eliminated, it is necessary to work with the existing rules for the
solution of the inevitable problems.
A few years ago in Pelican States Associates, Inc. v. Winder,"
both the court of appeal and the supreme court classified a hospital's
claim for room and board and other services as an "action on ac-
count" subject to the three-year prescription of article 3538. Neither
opinion cited any authority for this conclusion. In the more recent
case of Credit Service Corp. v. Prack,2 the court of appeal followed
the Winder classification but no reference is made to the analytical
criticism leading to the contrary conclusion that hospital charges
should fall under the ten-year prescription for personal actions under
article 3544. 3 Nor is reference made to the supreme court opinions
which emphatically state that the prescriptive period is fixed by the
nature of the debt not by the fact that an account is rendered showing
that the debt is due. 4
The inclusion of "accounts" within the group of claims subject
to the three-year prescription of article 3538 was made in the Revised
Civil Code of 1870, following Ray's Proposed Revision of 1869 in con-
formity with the original enactment in Act No. 118 of 1852.'1 There
was no corresponding provision in the Civil Codes of 1825 and 1808,
nor does this appear in the Code Napoleon.
In the case under consideration, the court stated "hospital
charges constituted the type of account for which statements are
usually rendered."'" The same can be said for claims subject to the
shorter prescriptions under article 3534 or the longer prescriptions of
articles 3540, 3544 and 3545. Similarly, the fact that it is customary
for banks and brokers to render "statements" does not necessarily
11. 208 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), aff'd, 253 La. 697, 219 So. 2d 500
(1969).
12. 270 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
13. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for -the 1968-1969 Term-
Prescription, 30 LA. L. REV. 235 (1969).
14. Jones v. Jones, 236 La. 52, 106 So. 2d 713 (1958); Antoine v. Franichevich, 163
So. 784, 786 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935), aff'd, 184 La. 612, 167 So. 98 (1936). See The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1958-1959 Term-Prescription, 20 LA.
L. REV. 235, 236 (1960).
15. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 3538 (comp. ed., 17 West LSA-Civ. Code 1972).
16. Credit Serv. Corp. v. Prack, 270 So. 2d 643, 645 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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classify claims under such statements as actions "on account" for the
three-year prescription of article 3538.
In Tillman v. New Orleans Saints Football Club,'7 a football
player made a claim under his contract of employment. The defen-
dant pleaded the one-year prescription of article 3534 against "serv-
ants," as comprehending all cases of a master-servant relationship.
The court properly rejected this argument on the ground that the
Civil Code has specific prescriptive periods for certain kinds of em-
ployment relationships so that the term "servants" in article 3534
could not possibly be all-inclusive. Furthermore, in view of the simi-
larity of the Code Napoleon and the interpretation of the French
commentators, the court held that the word "servants" in article 3534
does not apply to persons (1) who are employed under salaried con-
tracts like football players, and (2) the proper prescriptive period is
the ten-year general provision for personal actions of article 3544. It
is regrettable that an earlier case did not reason in the same way for
the claim of a trained nurse but felt constrained to classify a nurse
as a "servant" within article 3534."8
Another case in which the court properly looked to the nature of
the basic debt for the classification of the cause of action was Masset
v. Carver."' In a judicial separation, the husband assumed full respon-
sibility for certain community debts, releasing the wife entirely. This
was not an acknowledgement to interrupt prescription nor was it a
stipulation pour autrui, but was subject to the three-year prescription
of the alleged original loan under article 3538.
A different problem of classification appears in the case of
Barrios v. Sara Mayo Hospital" involving a malpractice suit against
a physician. The argument that in such a situation there can be either
a tort action (one year) or a breach of contract (ten years) or both is
really incorrect on all scores because article 3538 provides a three-
year prescription for physicians and this should cover all claims aris-
ing out of the physician-patient relationship. This has been discussed
in the comments of prior Symposia."' The confusion of having three
different possible classifications creates uncertainty in the law and
seems to result in judicial policy decisions in individual cases.
17. 265 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
18. Drs. Toler & Toler v. Munson, 163 So. 189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
19. 265 So. 2d 456 (La, App. 4th Cir. 1972).
20. 264 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
21. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964
Term-Prescription, 25 LA. L. REv. 352, 355-56 (1965); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term-Prescription, 24 LA. L. REV. 210, 213-14
(1964).
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Starting Point for the Running of Time
Horil v. Napko Paint Co.2 2 was a redhibitory action in which the
court properly applied the one-year prescription running from the
date of the sale as expressly provided in article 2534, rather than from
the discovery of the defect.2 3
In Cyr v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp.,24 an agreement to lay
a pipeline through a tract of farm land contained a provision that the
lines would be buried so as not to interfere with cultivation. The court
found that there was a breach of this obligation in that the lines were
not deep enough, and that the landowner's right to rescind or his right
to specific performance was subject to the ten-year prescription of
article 3544. The landowner contended that the time did not begin
to run until he discovered the breach when he wanted to change from
rice to sugar cane, pleading the doctrine of contra non valentem agere
non currit praescriptio. However, the original contract breach was not
concealed by ruse or misrepresentation or anything which prevented
the landowner from ascertaining the actual facts, and this plea was
accordingly dismissed. If the landowner brought suit for damages
under articles 3536 and 3537, the prescriptive period would be one
year and the starting point for the running of time would be the date
of his knowledge of the damage.
Interruption
In Nini v. Sanford Brothers, Inc., 5 the plaintiff instructed his
attorney to institute a lawsuit but he was killed in an accident prior
to the actual filing of the lawsuit. By the time his widow was substi-
tuted as party-plaintiff, the prescriptive period had run. The supreme
court held that the suit had been filed in a court of competent juris-
diction and proper venue,2" that it gave notice to the defendant of the
legal proceedings, and therefore constituted an interruption of pre-
scription.
In Northland Insurance Co. v. Kajan Specialty Co., Inc.," a
timely suit was filed for personal injuries and wrongful death. Then,
more than one year after the accident, but before trial, the insurer
as subrogee brought an action to recover damages paid to replace the
22. 270 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
23. Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Prescription, 31 LA. L. REv. 261-62 (1971).
24. 273 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
25. 276 So. 2d 262 (La. 1973).
26. A. R.S. 9:5801 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31 § 1.
27. 277 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 281 So. 2d 744 (La. 1973).
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demolished vehicle. The court held that the timely suit by one
plaintiff-subrogor interrupted prescription as to another plaintiff-
subrogee where both causes of action arose out of the same incident.
This was distinguished from the case of American Security Insurance
Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America"' where the action by the
subrogee was filed only after the rendition of judgment in the first
suit.
Levy v. Stelly8 is an important case and may be establishing a
new point in our jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of arti-
cle 3519. This article provides:
If the plaintiff in this case, after having made his demand, aban-
dons, voluntarily dismisses, or fails to prosecute it at the trial, the
interruption is considered as never having happened.
A timely tort action was filed in state court, but the second suit
filed in federal court was more than one year after the accident. When
the first suit was dismissed without prejudice, the defendant pleaded
prescription in the second suit. The court held that the question of
prescription as to the second suit must be determined as of the time
of its filing at which time the first suit was still pending and viable.
This was distinguished from the situation where the second suit is
filed after the abandonment or dismissal of the first suit,3" thereby
limiting the application of article 3519. The dissenting opinion in-
sisted upon the literal retroactive application of the code provision to
all cases of abandonment or dismissal. Analytically, there may be
merit to this position, but the majority took the other view presuma-
bly looking also to the policy consideration of preserving a substan-
tive right against the harsh result of a procedural technicality. It is
noteworthy that in the denial of a writ the supreme court said "The
Court of Appeal is correct."3' The same decision in similar circum-
stances was handed down by another panel of the same court in Tug
Alamo, Inc. v. Electronic Service, Inc.3"
In Derbofen and Juncker v. T. L. James & Co., Inc.,3  a timely
lawsuit resulted in a favorable judgment which also reserved plain-
tiffs right to sue for future damages. A second suit for such damages
was filed within one year from the finality of the first action but more
28. 220 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
29. 277 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 279 So. 2d 203 (La. 1973).
30. Cf. Adams v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 252 La. 798, 214 So. 2d 148 (1968); Long
v. Chailan, 196 La. 380, 199 So. 222 (1940).
31. Levy v. Stelly, 279 So. 2d 203 (La. 1973).
32. 275 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
33. 274 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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than one year from the plaintiff's knowledge of the wrongdoing. Since
the second suit was based on the same cause of action, the first suit
constituted an interruption so that the second suit was not barred by
prescription.
